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Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication
Using Registration List in Vehicular Ad Hoc
Networks
Hong Zhong, Bo Huang, Jie Cui, Yan Xu and Lu Liu
Abstract—Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have increased
in popularity in recent years and play an extremely important
role in the intelligent transportation field. However, the demands
of larger communication networks and the integrated message
verification process for ensuring security incur more communica-
tion and computation overheads, and directly affect the efficiency
of existing VANET schemes. To address this issue, this paper
proposes a novel and practical conditional privacy-preserving
authentication (CPPA) scheme, which uses the registration list
instead of the revocation list to reduce the communication over-
head. Specifically, our scheme can prevent malicious vehicles from
disrupting the security features of VANETs. Moreover, we do not
use the bilinear pairing operation, which is the most complicated
operation in modern cryptography, thus significantly reducing
the computation overhead and communication overhead. Security
and performance analyses demonstrate that our proposed scheme
is more secure and efficient than current schemes, and that the
proposed scheme is more suitable for VANET deployments.
Index Terms—Registration list; Resistance to continuous dis-
ruption; Modification of passwords; Conditional privacy; Elliptic
curve.
I. INTRODUCTION
AVehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is a special typeof mobile ad hoc network that enables communication
through multi-hops among the nodes in a wireless network.
VANETs, which are increasing in popularity, can provide
real-time information exchange by establishing connections
among vehicles on roads and road-side infrastructures [1].
VANETs are efficient in providing travel assistance and can
effectively reduce the driver’s workload through automatic
and intelligent driving controls, and facilitate higher comfort
and rich travel experience for passengers. VANETs can also
provide personal entertainment and in-car office functions by
facilitating Internet access to drivers and passengers [2][3].
In short, VANETs extend the functionalities and facilities of
vehicles as mobile information platforms rather than simple
transport entities, which significantly enrich the functions and
applications of vehicle systems.
The structure of VANETs generally consists of three mod-
ules, namely a Trusted Authority (TA), a Road Side Unit
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(RSU), and an On-Board Unit (OBU) [4]. TA is a trusted third
party with high computing power and large storage capacity
that is responsible for generating the system parameters and
distributing secret materials. RSU is a communication node
deployed as a road-side infrastructure that can communicate
with vehicles on a section of a road through wireless channels.
OBU, which is placed in vehicles, is responsible for issuing
and receiving traffic-related messages so that drivers can obtain
a better driving experience. In addition, a Tamper-Proof Device
(TPD) is used in some VANETs, which is equated to a black
box that prevents access to attackers. However, manufacturing
overheads of TPD are relatively expensive, so it has not
generally been deployed on VANETs on a large scale.
However, security remains one of the prevailing concerns in
VANET applications. Adversaries can control communication
with ease because communication is often enabled through
a wireless channel. There are two immediate implications;
first, it is fairly straightforward for attackers to issue illegal
messages in order to affect traffic patterns, or to forge mali-
cious information for the purpose of causing traffic accidents.
Second, attackers can easily track a vehicle, thus violating
user privacy. These two malicious behaviors have had serious
impacts upon the efficiency of VANETs in the recent past and
have threatened the safety of passenger lives and property in
some cases [5].
Also, VANET requires that the sender of the message needs
to be tracked quickly[6], and at the same time it should has the
ability to disqualify malicious vehicles from sending messages
quickly.Nowadays, many people make the same password in
different agencies for convenience, for example, the bank card
password and the vehicle password are the same. Then the
owner will not convenient tell the password to other people
directly while many drivers share a vehicle. At this point,
the function of modification of the password quickly and
convenient is very important and necessary.
In summary, VANETs require further study to enhance secu-
rity features, robustness, and reliability. To this end, this paper
proposes a novel and practical conditional privacy-preserving
authentication (CPPA) scheme, which uses the registration list
instead of the revocation list for reducing the communication
overhead. Important contributions of this paper include the
following:
1) Reduction in the retrieval time of the revocation list
when it is represented by the registration list in order to
reduce the think time available to attackers. Moreover,
the proposed scheme can prevent the attacker from con-
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tinually issuing malicious information, which effectively
improves the security of VANETs.
2) The proposed scheme allows the owner of a vehicle to
modify passwords anytime, anywhere, which provides
more flexibility and privileges to the VANET user.
3) The proposed scheme does not use bilinear pairing,
which is the most complicated operation in modern cryp-
tography, and additionally reduces the message length
to minimize both the computation and communication
overheads in VANETs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
introduces the related research of CPPA schemes in VANETs.
The background knowledge and system model are introduced
in Section III. Section IV describes our proposed scheme in
detail and Section V presents the security analysis of the pro-
posed scheme. Section VI presents the performance evaluation,
including calculation overhead and communication overhead
comparisons. Finally, Section VII discusses the conclusion and
future research.
II. RELATED WORK
A wide range of research has focused on enhancing the
safety and efficiencies of VANETs in the recent past.
Raya et al. [7] proposed a CPPA scheme based on the
public key infrastructure (PKI), which used public/private key
pairs and corresponding certificates to hide a vehicle’s true
identity. However, there are two obvious shortcomings: first,
the OBU of each vehicle requires large storage space to save
the public/private key pairs and the corresponding certificates;
second, the TA must carry out a complete traversal in its
storage space while seeking the true identity of the attacker,
thus resulting in larger time and memory overheads.
C. Zhang et al. [8] highlighted that the computation power
of the OBU in vehicles is not capable of performing complex
computational operations within a short time when the number
of vehicles in the VANET is relatively large. Allowing the
nearby RSU to verify the message can assist the OBU in
the computation, but a more effective method of reducing the
OBUs computation and communication overheads in VANETs
is an urgent problem.
Wu et al. [9] and L. Zhang et al. [10] proposed a CPPA
scheme based on a group signature in which the OBU no
longer needs to store more private data and the TA can
effectively track the true identity of an attacker based on the
revocation list without incurring the overheads caused by the
retrieval of the revocation list. However, because the speed of
the vehicle is fast and network topology changes quickly as
the vehicle progresses, it is difficult to update and select the
group managers and group members dynamically.
Chim et al. [11] proposed a scheme using a software-based
bilinear pairing operation in which the RSU uses a pseudo
identity to protect its true identity during message communi-
cation by establishing a shared key in the handshaking phase
between the RSU and the TA, where the TA can also track
the true identity behind the pseudo identity. In the certification
phase, the RSU issues a notification message with a Bloom
filter to reduce the OBUs computation overhead. But Horng et
al. [12] later pointed out that the scheme proposed by Chim et
al. [11] cannot resist an impersonation attack; that is, malicious
vehicles can disguise themselves as legitimate vehicles to send
a malicious message after intercepting a legal message.
K. A. Shim. [13] proposed a security ID-based CPPA
scheme in which the RSU supports batch authentication of
messages to reduce the computation overhead of the RSU
when the number of messages is large. However, the TA must
consume more time in retrieving the entire revocation list, and
furthermore it does not address the additional authentication
overheads caused by illegal information.
J. Zhang et al. [14] proposed another ID-based CPPA
scheme to optimize the computation overheads in the message
signature and authentication process, while the scheme also
supports batch authentication in order to improve the efficiency
of identity authentication. However, Lee et al. [15] later
pointed out that this scheme cannot achieve the function of
non-repudiation, and Liu et al. [16] pointed out that the scheme
cannot resist a modification attack.
In order to improve the communication efficiency while
ensuring the conditional privacy protection of the vehicles
in VANETs, He et al. [17] proposed an efficient and fast
signature scheme without using the bilinear pairing operation.
This scheme reduces the computation overhead significantly
while meeting security requirements.
Zhong et al. [18] proposed a CPPA scheme to optimize the
computation process and to reduce the computation overhead
based on the scheme proposed by He et al. [17]. However,
the schemes proposed by He et al. [17] and Zhong et al. [18]
include several security assumptions, as it is difficult to equip
each vehicle with a TPD in practice. During an attack, TA
can track the true identity of the attacker but cannot prevent
it from sending additional malicious messages.
In order to solve the above problems, this paper proposes
a novel and practical conditional privacy protection scheme
based on the scheme of He et al. [19], which improves
communication efficiency under the premise of reducing the
demands in the security hypothesis. Additionally, our scheme
can effectively prevent the attacker from continually sending
malicious information because of the presence of the registra-
tion list, which improves the security features of VANETs.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the system model of our
scheme and a background on the security requirements in
VANETs.
A. System Model
The structure of VANETs consists of three parts in general:
Trusted Authority (TA), Road Side Unit (RSU) and On Board
Unit (OBU), as showed in Fig. 1.
Information among OBUs or between OBU and RSU is
transmitted over the wireless channel, and information be-
tween TA and RSU is transmitted over the wired channel [20].
TA, a trusted third party with very high computing power
and storage capacity, is responsible for generating the system
parameters and distributing the secret material. It is also
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Fig. 1. System Model.
responsible for the offline registration of OBU and RSU and
stores the registration list of RSU and OBU.
RSU, a trusted roadside node with high computing power
and storage capacity, verifies the validity and integrity of
the message and then broadcasts the relevant message to the
surrounding vehicles by the notification message. It can also
identify the real identity of the attacker if necessary, and then
notify the real identity to the TA. Because the number of RSU
is less than OBU, and RSU is easier to be maintained than the
OBU in VANETs, RSUs are more equipped with TPD than
OBU in practice.
OBU is a semi-trusted computing unit with lower computing
power and storage capacity load on the vehicle. It is respon-
sible for calculating and issuing traffic-related messages and
receiving notification messages from the RSU.
System assumptions in our scheme are as follows:
1) TA is completely trustworthy and will not be compro-
mised by attackers in anytime.
2) The time in various parts of the entire VANET is
synchronized.
3) RSU’s computing power and storage capacity are lower
than TA and higher than OBUs.
B. Security Requirements
1) Identity privacy preservation: The attacker should not be
able to obtain the real identity of the vehicles through
the messages sent by the vehicles. Only the TA can track
the real identity of the sender of a given message.
2) Traceability: The TA should be able to track the real
identity of the attacker through malicious messages and
counteract if necessary.
3) Non-repudiation: When the vehicle sends a message, it
cannot deny it.
4) Un-linkability: The attacker should not be able to de-
termine whether the messages are issued by the same
vehicle through the message content.
5) Resistant to continuous disruption: As a kind of real-
time network, VANETs should not only be able to trace
the real identity when the attacker appears, but should
also possess the ability to cease the continuous malicious
behaviors.
6) Modification of passwords: The owner of a vehicle
should be able to modify the passwords anytime, any-
where.
7) Resistance to ordinary attacks: The CPPA scheme in
VANETs should have the ability to resist some ordinary
attacks, such as replay attack, modification attack and
impersonation attack.
C. Preliminary Knowledge
1) The one-way hash function h() is said to be secure if
the following properties are satisfied [21]:
 h can take a message of arbitrary length as input and
produces a message digest of a fixed-length output;
 Given x, it is easy to compute y = h(x). However,
given y, it is hard to compute x = h 1(y);
 Given x, it is computationally infeasible to find x0 6=
x that h(x0) 6= h(x).
2) Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP):
The ECDLP problem [22] is to determine the integer
x, 0  x  q   1 , such as Q = xP ,while two points
P;Q of order q are on a given elliptic curve.
3) Computation Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH):
The CDH problem [22] is to compute abP 2 G, while
P; aP; bP 2 G is given and a; b 2 Zq is unknown.
4) Bloom Filter:
A bloom filter [11] is an algorithm for representing
a set A = a1; a2; a3; :::an of n elements to support
membership queries. The idea is to allocate a vector
vn with m bits, initially all set to 0, and a secure hash
functions h() , and used to compute the hash value of
element, if the element in the set A, and then the bit
of the corresponding position is set to 1. To determine
whether a given value b is in A, we can check the bits
at positions h(b). If this position is set as 1, then b is
definitely in the set A.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
The proposed scheme in our paper mainly includes two
main phases such as the offline registration and the driving
stage. Offline registration includes the initialization of TA
and registration of RSUs and vehicles. The driving stage
includes five phases including mutual authentication, release of
traffic information, message verification, release of notification
message and receiving messages. The main symbols used in
our scheme and their definitions are illustrated in Table I.
A. Offline Registration
In this section, we introduce the system initialization phase.
RSU and OBU get registered offline while in the factory or
annual inspection. TA is responsible for the corresponding
identity (ID) distribution and management.
 a. Initialization of TA
TA is a trusted third party with a high computing power and
storage capacity that coordinates and controls the operation of
the entire VANETs. Details of TAs Initialization are as follows:
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TABLE I
NOTATION
Notation Descriptions
p; q Two large prime numbers.
E
An elliptic curve defined by the equation
y2 = x3 + ax+ bmodp ,wherea; b 2 Fp.
G
An additive group which consists of all points
on the elliptic curve E.
IDR; T
reg
RSU
The real identity is associated with the location
and its corresponding registration time of RSU.
IDV ; T
reg
OBU
The real identity and its responding registration
time of Vehicle.
PW1; PW2 Two passwords of vehicle.
PKRSU ; SKRSU
The public key and corresponding private key
of RSU.
LRSU The registration lists of RSU that saved in TA.
LOBU The registration lists of vehicle that saved in TA.
Lm The message list that saved in RSU.
h() A secure hash function.
1) TA chooses two large prime numbers p; q and an additive
group G with the order q and its generator is P , which
consists of all points on the elliptic curve E defined by
the equation y2 = x3 + ax+ b mod p, where a; b 2 Fp.
2) TA chooses a random number s 2 Zq as the master
private key, and computes Ppub = s  P as the master
public key.
3) TA chooses a secure hash function h().
4) TA broadcasts the system parameter fp; q; a; b; P; Ppub;
hg periodicity.
 b. Registration of RSU
TA chooses the identity IDR of RSU according to its
location, and computes KR = h(IDRjjs), where T regRSU is
the corresponding registration time. After that, TA saves <
T regRSU ; IDR > to registration list LRSU and sends fKR; IDRg
to RSU.
 c. Registration of Vehicle
TA chooses the identity IDV and two passwords
PW1; PW2 and then calculates KV = h(IDV jjs) andZV =
KV  h(PW1jjPW2), where T regOBU is the corresponding
registration time, KV and ZV will be used in the mod-
ification of passwords if needed. After that, TA saves <
T regOBU ; IDV > to registration list LOBU , and then sends
fIDV ; PW1; PW2; ZV ; T regOBUg and fIDV ; PW1; PW2g to
OBU and the owner of the vehicle respectively.
B. Driving Stage
At this phase, RSU periodicity broadcasts message
fIDR; PKRSUg to all vehicles in its range, where PKRSU
is the public key of RSU. Whenever a given vehicle enters
the range of a new RSU, OBU generates a pseudo identity
and sends it to the corresponding RSU. After that, RSU sends
the message related to the vehicles pseudo identity to the TA
after receiving and processing the message from the vehicle.
TA returns the message to the RSU after confirming the legal
presence of RSU and OBU in the registration list based on
the timestamp. RSU the broadcasts the corresponding message
after the computation process. When the vehicle receives the
message and confirms its legitimacy, OBU, RSU and TA
should have completed the mutual authentication process.
After the authentication process, OBU can issue the traffic
information with the help of RSU. The details are as follows:
 a. Mutual Authentication
1) Driver needs to input the identity and two passwords
IDV ; PW1; PW2 to start OBU, and then OBU will
check whether IDV and PW1; PW2 are identical to
the stored ones. If so, OBU computes KV = ZV 
h(PW1jjPW2). After that, OBU chooses a random
number x 2 Zq , and computes X = xP , X = xPpub
and PIDV = IDV  h(X). Obviously, the above
calculation process can be done off-line in advance.
When a vehicle enters the range of a new R-
SU, it computes the two signature hash equations
OBU = h(T1jjIDV jjIDRjjKV jjXjjX)and check =
h(T regOBU jjT1jjXjjPIDV jjOBU ).
Finally, OBU sends fT regOBU ; T1; X; PIDV ; OBU ;
checkg to RSU.
2) Upon receiving the message fT regOBU ; T1; X; PIDV ;
OBUg sent by the vehicle, RSU checks whether the
timestamp T1 is the latest or not. All the timestamps
are tested in the following way: t1 is the value that the
current time value minus the time value contained in
the received timestamp, t2 is the value that the clock
difference value plus the time delay value, and then
judge that whether t1 is less than t2. If yes, that means
it is the latest, than RSU checks whether the equation
check
?
=h(T regOBU jjT1jjXjjPIDV jjOBU ) exists. If so,
RSU chooses a random number y 2 Zq and computes
Y = y  P , Y  = y  Ppub, PIDR = IDR  h(Y ) and
RSU = h(T2jjPIDV jjXjjOBU jjIDRjjKV jjY jjY ).
Now, RSU saves the item < T2; X; Y; Y  > to the
handshaking list Lhs stored in TPD, and then sends
fT regRSU ; T2; Y; PIDR; RSU ; T regOBU ; T1; X; PIDV ;
OBUg to TA. Data stored in TPD are periodically
deleted in order to reduce its storage burden.
3) Upon receiving the message fT regRSU ; T2; Y; PIDR;
RSU ; T
reg
OBU ; T1; X; PIDV ; OBUg, TA checks
whether the timestamp T2 is the latest. If it is the latest,
TA computes Y  = Y  s and IDR = PIDR  h(Y ).
Now TA checks whether IDR is contained
in the registration list LRSU according to
the timestamp T regRSU . If so, TA computes
KR = h(IDRjjs) and checks whether the equation
RSU
?
=h(T2jjPIDV jjXjjOBU jjIDRjjKV jjY jjY )
holds. exists. If so, TA computes X = X  s and
IDV = PIDV  h(X).
Third, TA checks whether IDV is contained in the
registration list LOBU according to timestamp T
reg
OBU . If
yes, TA computesKV = h(IDV jjs) and checks whether
the equation OBU
?
=h(T1jjIDV jjIDRjjKV jjXjjX)
exists. If so, TA computes TAIDV = IDV h(Y jjY jj
KR), TA RSU = h(T3jjIDV jjTAIDV jjXjjIDRjjY jj
KR),TAIDR = IDR  h(XjjXjjKV ) and IDV =
PIDV  h(X).
Finally, TA sends the message fT3; T2; T regOBU ;
TA OBU ; TA RSU ; TAIDV ; TAIDRg to RSU.
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4) Upon receiving the message fT3; T2; T regOBU ; TA OBU ;
TA RSU ; TAIDV ; TAIDRg, RSU checks whether
the timestamp T3 is the latest. If it is the latest,
RSU identifies the item < T2; X; Y; Y  > in
the handshaking list Lhs according to T2, and
computes IDV = TAIDV  h(Y jjY jjKR)
and further checks whether the equation
TA RSU
?
=h(T3jjIDV jjTAIDV jjXjjIDRjjY jjKR)
exists. If so, RSU computes SK = y  X and
RSU OBU = h(T4jjIDV jjIDRjjXjjY jjSKjj
TA OBU ).
At last, RSU saves the item < T regOBU ; IDV ; X; Y;
SK; TA OBU > to the authentication list Lauth which
is stored in TPD, and sends fT4; TAIDR; TA OBU ;
RSU OBU ; Y g to RSU. To reduce the storage burden
of TPD, the data that stored in it will be deleted
periodically.
5) Upon receiving the message fT4; TAIDR; TA OBU ;
RSU OBU ; Y g , OBU checks the whether the
timestamp T4 is the latest. If it is the latest,
OBU computes the equation IDR = TAIDR 
h(XjjXjjKV ) and checks whether the equation
TA OBU
?
=h(IDV jjXjjXjjIDRjjY jjKV ) exists. If
yes, OBU calculates SK = x  Y checks whether the
equation RSU OBU = h(T4jjIDV jjIDRjjXjjY jjSKjj
TA OBU ) exists.
By now, OBU, RSU and TA should have completed the
mutual certification process, therefore, the vehicle is legal and
RSU has not been compromised.
 b. Release of Traffic Information
If a vehicle in travel wants to issue traffic information ,
OBU sends fT5;m; mg to RSU and to other vehicles, where
m = h(T5jjmjjIDRjjIDV jjXjjY jjSKjjTA OBU ).
 c. Message Verification
Upon receiving the message fT5;m; mg, RSU checks
whether the timestamp T5 is the latest. If it is the latest, RSU
finds out the item< T regOBU ; IDV ; X; Y; SK; TA OBU >
in the authentication list Lauth according to the equation
m
?
=h(T5jjmjjIDRjjIDV jjXjjY jjSKjjTA OBU ) .If the e-
quation is not satisfied, the message fT5;m; mg is invalid.
 d. Release of Notification Message
At this stage, the notification message is issued by the RSU,
consisting of the bloom filters (a positive filter and a negative
filter). The positive filter stores the hash value of legitimate
traffic message and their timestamp, and the negative filter
stores the hash value of illegitimate Traffic information and
their timestamp. [11]. It is encrypted with the private key
SKRSU of the RSU which can prevent an attacker from
modifying or forging the notification message.
 e. Receiving Messages
Upon receiving the notification message from RSU, OBU
decrypts it using the public key PKRSU of RSU. If a vehicle
wants to verify the validity of the message fT5;m; mg sent
by the other vehicles, OBU will compute h(T5;m) and check
whether this value is in the notification message. There are
three cases of the results, as showed in Table II.
TABLE II
THE SEARCH RESULTS
Case Positive Filter Negative Filter Result of the Message
1 True False Valid
2 False True Invalid
3 False False Wait for next broadcast
Case 1 means that the message is legitimate, and case 2
indicates that the message is illegitimate. Case 3 depicts that
the message has not been authenticated by RSU, therefore, the
vehicle just needs to wait for the next notification message
from RSU.
V. SECURITY ANLYSIS AND COMPARISONS
Security is one of the basic requirements and core elements
of VANETs. In this section, the security features of the
proposed scheme is proven to ensure that VANETs security
requirements have been met, and further the proposed scheme
has been evaluated against a few existing security schemes.
A. Security Proof
The security model of our scheme is to designed construct
a game between challenger C and adversary A that is,
whether the adversary A can win the game of overcoming
the challenge given by the challenger C in the polynomial
time with a non-negligible probability.
Definition 1. In the game constructed by the security model
of the CPPA scheme in VANETs, the scheme is secure if the
advantage of the adversaryA is negligible in polynomial time.
Theorem 1. The registration of RSU in the proposed
scheme is secure in the random oracle model.
Proof. Suppose there is an adversary A who can forge
a legitimate message fIDR;KRg, we construct a challenger
C that can solve the ECDLP problem with a non-negligible
probability by running A as a subroutine.
Setup   Oracle : C chooses a random number s 2 Zq
as the master private key, and computes Ppub = s  P
as the master public key and generates public parameters
fp; q; a; b; P; Ppub; hg.
h Oracle : C keeps the list Lh which maintains the item of
query from A along with its corresponding answer fIDR; g,
while the list is initialized to be empty. Upon receiving a query
IDR from A , C checks whether the item fIDR; g is in the
list or not. If yes, C sends  to A . Otherwise C computes
 = h(IDRjjs), saves fIDR; g to Lh, and sends  to A .
Sign Oracle : Upon receiving a query IDR from A , A
computes KR = h(IDRjjs) and sends fIDR;KRg to A. We
can know that KR is the signature of IDR that is calculated
by TA in our scheme.
Output : At last, A outputs fID0R;K 0Rg, and then C
checks whether the equation K 0R = h(ID
0
Rjjs) is satisfied. If
not, the game is over andA fails in the game. If yes, according
to the forgery lemma [23], A will output another valid
signature fID00R;K 00Rg when the equation K 00R = h(ID00Rjjs)
is satisfied.
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It means that A can work out K 00R  K 0R = h(ID00Rjjs)  
h(ID0Rjjs). However, the result is contradictory with the un-
idirectionality of the secure hash function and the ECDLP is a
difficult problem, which means A cannot work out the above
equation. Therefore, theorem 1 is proved.
Theorem 2. The registration of a vehicle in the proposed
scheme is secure in the random oracle model.
Proof. Suppose there is an adversary A who can forge a le-
gitimate message fIDV ;KV ; ZV g, we construct a challenger
C that can solve the ECDLP problem with a non-negligible
probability by running A as a subroutine.
Setup   Oracle : C chooses a random number s 2
Zq as the master private key, computes Ppub = s  P
as the master public key and generates public parameters
fp; q; a; b; P; Ppub; hg.
h Oracle : C keeps the list Lh which maintains the item
of query from A and its corresponding answer fIDV ; g,
while the list is initialized to be empty. Upon receiving a query
IDV from A , C checks whether the item fIDV ; g is in the
list or not. If yes, C sends  to A . Otherwise C computes
 = h(IDV jjs), saves fIDV ; g to , and sends  to A .
   Oracle : C keeps the list L which maintains
the item of query from A and its corresponding answer
fh(PW1jjPW2);  0g, while the list is initialized to be empty.
Upon receiving a query h(PW1jjPW2) from A , C check-
s whether the item fh(PW1jjPW2);  0g is in the list. If
yes,C sends  0 to A . Otherwise C computes  0 = KV 
h(PW1jjPW2), saves fh(PW1jjPW2);  0g to L, and sends
 0 to A .
Sign   Oracle : Upon receiving a query IDV
and h(PW1jjPW2) from A , C computes KV =
h(IDV jjs) and ZV = KV  h(PW1jjPW2), sends
fIDV ; h(PW1jjPW2);KV ; ZV g to A . We can know that
KV and ZV is the signature of IDV and h(PW1jjPW2) those
are calculated by TA in our scheme.
Output : At last, A outputs fID0V ; h0(PW1jjPW2);K 0V ;
Z 0V g, and then C checks whether the equation K 0V =
h(ID0V jjs) and Z 0V = K 0V  h0(PW1jjPW2) is satisfied.
If not, the game is over and A fails in the game. If yes,
according to the forgery lemma [23], A will output another
valid signature fID00V ; h00(PW1jjPW2);K 00V ; Z 00V g which the
equation K 00V = h(ID
00
V jjs) and Z 00V = K 00V h00(PW1jjPW2)
is satisfied.
It means that A can work out K 00R  K 0R = h(ID00V jjs)  
h(ID0V jjs). However, the result is contradictory with the
unidirectionality of the secure hash function and the ECDLP
is a difficult problem, which means A cannot work out the
above equation. Therefore, theorem 2 is proved.
Theorem 3. The process of sending an authentication
message by OBU in the proposed scheme is secure in the
random oracle model.
Theorem 4. The process of calculating an authentication
message from OBU by RSU in the proposed scheme is secure
in the random oracle model.
Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 can be proved by the same way.
Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure in the random oracle
model.
The next section analyzes the security requirements of the
CPPA scheme in VANETs.
1) Identity privacy preservation: Normally, the vehicle only
sends the pseudo identity once it comes within the range
of RSU. Pseudo identity is computed by the equation
X = x  Ppub and PIDV = IDV  h(X), where
x 2 Zq is a random number. Therefore, no attacker
can obtain the real identity IDV of the vehicle through
the pseudo identity PIDV . It means that our proposed
scheme has met the requirements of identity privacy
preservation.
2) Traceability: RSU can search the item < T regOBU ; T5;m;
IDV > according to T5 in the message list Lm
when it encounters malicious messages, and then sends
< T regOBU ; IDV > to TA. TA can search the item
< T regOBU ; IDV > according to T
reg
OBU in the registration
list LRSU while RSU is comprised.
3) Non-repudiation: RSU can search out the item< T regOBU ;
T5;m; IDV > according to the timestamp T5 in the
message list Lm quickly, which includes the real identity
of the vehicle and its registration time. Therefore, our
scheme has met the requirements of Non-repudiation.
4) Un-linkability: The format of message related to traffic
information in our proposed scheme is fT5;m; mg,
where m = h(IDRjjIDV jjXjjY jjSKjjTA OBU jjm
jjT5), therefore, the attacker cannot determine whether
the two given messages are issued by the same vehicle
using the message content, which achieves the security
requirements of un-linkability.
5) Resistant to continuous disruption: TA will delete the
registration form in the corresponding registration list
when either the real identity of a malicious vehicle or a
compromised RSU is detected. Therefore, when either
a malicious vehicle is authenticated by a valid RSU or
a legitimate vehicle is authenticated by a compromised
RSU, TA will immediately stop the certification process
to prevent continuous damage.
6) Modification of passwords: The owner of a vehicle can
change the passwords anytime anywhere whenever he
considers the passwords is not secure and the details are
as follows. Owner inputs IDV ; PW old1 ; PW2; PW
new
1
to start OBU. OBU will check whether IDV and
PW old1 ; PW2 are identical to the stored ones. If yes,
OBU computes KV = ZV  h(PW old1 jjPW2) and
ZnewV = KV  h(PWnew1 jjPW2). At last, OBU only
needs to replace ZoldV with Z
new
V .
7) Resistance to ordinary attacks:
 Replay attack: RSU will check the timestamp while
receiving a message, once it is found not to be the
latest, RSU will drop it immediately.
 Modification attack: It is impossible that the at-
tacker can modify a legal message fT5;m; mg to
fT5;m0; 0mg where 0m = h(IDRjjIDV jjXjjY jj
SKjjTA OBU jjm0jjT5), while the sent real iden-
tity of a vehicle fT5;m; mg is unknown.
 Impersonation attack: If the attacker wants to send
a legal message by impersonating the legal vehicle,
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it must obtain the real identity of the vehicle.
However the attacker cannot obtain the real identity
of the vehicle according to the preceding knowl-
edge. Therefore, our proposed scheme can resist the
impersonation attack.
B. Security Comparisons
In general, the security requirements of VANETs mainly
span across message authentication, preservation of identity
privacy, traceability, un-linkability, resistant to continuous dis-
ruption, modification of passwords, and resistance to ordinary
attacks. We evaluate the performance of our scheme against
four existing schemes in terms of the security requirements of
VANETs. The results are presented in Table III.
TABLE III
SECURITY COMPARISONS
Shim et
al.[13]
Zhang et
al.[14]
He et
al.[17]
Zhong et
al.[18]
The
proposed
scheme
Preservation
of identity
privacy
p p p p p
Traceability p p p p p
Un-linkability  p p p p
Resistant to
continuous
disruption
    p
Modification
of passwords    
p
Among the evaluated schemes, the other four schemes are
not resistant to continuous disruption and modification of
passwords. Though, our proposed scheme effectively satisfies
all the security requirements of VANETs.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The performance of VANETs is susceptible to computation
and communication overheads due to the rapid speed of the
vehicles and the rapid changes in the network topology.
A. Computation Overhead Analysis
The CPPA schemes proposed by Shim et al. [13] and Zhang
et al. [14] are based on bilinear pairing, where the additive
group G with the order q and its generator P constitutes
all points on the elliptic curve E defined by the equation
y2 = x3 + x mod p , where p is a 512-bit prime number and
q is a 160-bit prime number. The schemes proposed by He
et al. [17] and Zhong et al. [18] are based on Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) to achieve the same level of security,
where the additive group G with the order q and its generator
pconstitutes all points on the elliptic curve E defined by the
equation y2 = x3 + ax + b mod p, where a; b 2 Fp, p and q
is a 160-bit prime number. The cryptography library used in
our experiment is MIRACL[30], which is a well-known and
widely used cryptographic library in computing the time re-
quired for various cryptographic operations. And our hardware
platform consists of an Intel I7-6700 processor8 gigabytes
memory and runs Windows 7 operating system.The definition
and execution time of related operations in cryptography are
shown in Table IV.
TABLE IV
THE DEFINITION AND EXECUTION TIME OF RELATED OPERATIONS
Operation Definition Executiontime(ms)
Tsm bp
The time of a scale multiplication
operation in a group based
on bilinear pairing
0.694
Tsm ecc
The time required for performing
a scalar point multiplication
in a group based on ECC
0.3218
Tsm bp s
The time required for performing
a small scalar point multiplication
in a group based on ECC
0.0736
Tsm ecc s
The time of a scale multiplication
operation in a group
based on bilinear pairing
0.0246
Tpa bp
The time of a point addition
operation in a group
based on bilinear pairing
0.0018
Tpa ecc
The execution time of a point
addition operation based on ECC 0.0024
Tbp
The time required to
execute a bilinear pairing operation. 5.086
Th
The execution time of
a general hash function operation 0.001
Tmtp
The time required for executing
a hash function that maps
a string to a point in group
0.0992
The calculation and storage capacity of OBU are low and
the number of vehicles is more than RSU, therefore one of the
purposes of our scheme is to reduce the OBUs computation
overhead. The performance evaluation of the schemes in terms
of the execution time consumed to send traffic-related message
(that is generating the pseudo identity and message signature)
by OBU is shown in Table V.
TABLE V
THE COMPARISON OF THE EXECUTION TIME
Scheme Single traffic-relatedmessage n traffic-related messages
Shim
et al.[13]
3Tsm bp
+2Tpa bp + 1Th
 2.0866ms
(3n)Tsm bp
+(2n)Tpa bp
+nTh
 2:0866n ms
Zhang
et al.[14]
6Tsm bp + 2Tpa bp
+1Tmtp + 4Th
 4.2708 ms
(6n)Tsm bp
+(2n)Tpa bp
+(4n)Th
 4:2708n ms
He
et al.[17]
3Tsm ecc + 3Th
 0.9684 ms
(3n)Tsm ecc
+(3n)Th
 0:9684n ms
Zhong
et al.[18]
2Tsm ecc + 2Th
 0.6456 ms
(2n)Tsm ecc
+(2n)Th
 0:6456n ms
The
proposed
scheme
1Tsm ecc + 6Th
 0.3278 m
The worst case:
nTsm ecc + (6n)Th
 0:3278n ms
The best case:
1Tsm ecc + (n+ 5)Th
 0:001n+ 0:3218 ms
In the scheme of Zhang et al. [14], the execution time of
issuing single traffic-related messages is 6Tsm bp+2Tpa bp+
1Tmtp + 4Th  14:6746 ms and the execution time of
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issue n traffic-related message is (6n)Tsm bp+(2n)Tpa bp+
(4n)Th  14:6746n ms, while the execution time in the
scheme proposed by Zhong et al. [18] is 2Tsm ecc + 2Th 
0:8842 ms and (2n)Tsm ecc+(2n)Th  0:8842n ms respec-
tively.
In our scheme, whenever the vehicle enters the range of a
new RSU, it is necessary to send the identity authentication
message to RSU, and the RSU will send messages to TA after
processing the identity authentication message which ensures
that no malicious vehicle or compromised RSU is involved in
the transmission process of traffic-related message. When n
traffic-related messages needs to be sent, the worst case is that
the OBU sends an identity authentication message to the RSU
for each traffic-related messages. Therefore the execution time
of OBU is nTsm ecc+(6n)Th  0:4426n ms. While the best
case is when OBU sends the identity authentication message
only once in the range of RSU, therefore the execution time
of the OBU is 1Tsm ecc+(n+5)Th  0:0001n+0:4435 ms.
Number of messages
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50
100
150
200
250
Shim et al.[13]
Zhang et al.[14]
He et al.[17]
Zhong et al.[18]
The worst case of the proposed scheme
The best case of the proposed scheme
Fig. 2. The comparison of the execution time.
Consider, the coverage of the RSU is about 600 m, the
vehicle speed is between 0 km/h and 120 km/h [7] and the
time taken for sending traffic information message is 100-300
ms [24]. Now, OBU needs to send at least 50 traffic-related
messages in the range of RSU. From Fig. 2, the execution
time required by OBU to issue traffic-related message in our
proposed scheme is much less than that of the other four
schemes even in the worst case.
The speed of traffic-related message verification process
also determines the computation efficiency of VANETs. As-
suming there are 500 vehicles in the range of RSU, the RSU
needs to verify 2500-5000 messages per second [25].
Traffic-related message verification process in our scheme
is carried out by RSU which usually comprises more storage
and computing power. RSU issues the notification information
which is encrypted with the private key and the OBU only
needs to decrypt the notification information using the public
key, and the operation time of decryption is negligible. Upon
receiving the traffic information message, the RSU will find
out the item < T regOBU ; IDV ; X; Y; SK; TA OBU > in the
list Lauth which satisfies the signature equation. Considering
the storage capacity of TPD in the VANETs, TPD will delete
the private data before a certain time. Therefore, the data in
the list Lauth will be deleted periodically, and the number
of item in the list is usually maintained at a level more than
that of vehicles in order to continue the process when the
vehicle speed is low. Assuming there are 500 vehicles within
the RSU coverage, the number of item saved in the list Lauth
is 1000, the best case in message authentication process is
that only one hash function is performed and the worst case is
carried out with 1000 hash functions. The execution time of
the message verification process with 500 hash functions by
all the evaluated schemes is depicted in Table VI.
TABLE VI
THE EXECUTION TIME OF MESSAGE VERIFICATION PROCESS
Scheme Single traffic information n traffic information
Shim
et al.[13]
3Tbp + 2Tsm bp
+1Tpa bp + 2Th
 16:6498ms
3Tbp + (2 + 1)Tsm bp
+(3n  3)Tpa bp + 2nTh
 0:74n+ 17:3346 ms
Zhang
et al.[14]
3Tbp + 2Tsm bp
+1Tpa bp + 3T
 16.6508 ms
3Tbp + (n+ 1)Tsm bp
+(2n)Tsm bp s
+Th(3n  2)Tpa bp
+(3n)Th
 0:8496n+ 15:9484 ms
He
et al.[17]
3Tsm ecc + 2Th
+2Tpa ecc
 0:9722 ms
(n+ 2)Tsm ecc
+(2n)Tsm ecc s
+(3n  1)Tpa ecc
+(2n)Th
 0:5003n+ 0:6412 ms
Zhong
et al.[18]
3Tsm ecc + 2Th
+1Tpa ecc
 0.9698 ms
(n+ 2)Tsm ecc
+(2n)Tsm ecc s
+(2n  1)Tpa ecc
+(2n)Th
 0:5021n+ 0:6412 ms
The
proposed
scheme
500Th
 0.5 ms
(500n)Th
 0:5n ms
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Fig. 3. The comparison of authenticating message time.
From Fig.3, it can be observed that the time consumed to
authenticate a message in the schemes proposed by Shim et al.
[13] and Zhang et al. [14] is similar, and the time consumed
in our scheme is significantly lower than them. Yet, the result
is almost the same to the schemes proposed by He et al.
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[17] and Zhong et al. [18]. However, the above results are
based on the fact that all of the authenticated messages are
legitimate, but batch authentication usually fails when illegal
messages appear. Under such a scenario, the TA only detects
the illegal messages by adopting the binary search strategy
[11], which will lead to obvious reduction in the efficiency
of batch authentication. Although our proposed scheme does
not support batch certification, the efficiency of the message
verification process is relatively stable, thus our scheme is
superior to the other evaluated schemes in VANETs.
B. Communication Overhead Analysis
This section evaluated the communication overhead efficien-
cies of the evaluated schemes. The additive group G with the
order q and its generator P constitutes all the points on the
elliptic curve E defined by the equation y2 = x3 + x mod p,
where p is a 512-bit prime number and q is a 160-bit prime
number. The additive group G with the order q and its
generator pconstitutes all the points on the elliptic curve E
defined by the equation y2 = x3 + ax + b mod p, where
a; b 2 Fp, p and q is a 160-bit prime number. Therefore,
the size of each element in G and G is 128 bytes and 40
bytes respectively [26]. We assume that the timestamp and
the output of the secure hash function are 4 bytes and 20
bytes respectively [27] and the size of each element in Zq
is 20 bytes. If the traffic information in the messages are the
same, we only need to consider the message length. Table
VII presents the communication overhead performance of the
evaluated schemes. .
TABLE VII
THE COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
Scheme Single message n messages
Shim et al.[13] 644 644n
Zhang et al.[14] 388 388n
He et al.[17] 124 124n
Zhong et al.[18] 84 84n
The proposed scheme 24 24n
In CPPA scheme of VANETs, the value T in the traffic-
related message denotes the timestamp. As is shown in Table
VII, the traffic-related messages in the scheme of He et al.[17]
are fM;AID; T;R; g, where AID = fAID1; AID2g,
AID1; R 2 G and AID2;  2 Zq , and the length of
a single traffic-related message is 40*2+20*2+4=124 bytes.
Moreover, In the CPPA scheme of Zhong et al. [18], the ve-
hicle broadcasts the traffic-related messages fAID;M; ; Tg
to others, where AID = fAID1; AID2g, AID 2 G and
AID2;  2 Zq , and the length of a single traffic-related
message is 40+202+4 = 84 bytes. Traffic-related messages
are fT;m; g in our proposed scheme, where  2 Zq , and
the length of a single traffic-related message is 20 + 4 = 24
bytes.Therefore, the proposed scheme is superior to the other
four schemes in terms of reducing the communication over-
heads. Thus, from the aforementioned comparative evaluations
of the schemes in terms of reducing the computation and
communication overheads, we can draw the conclusion that
our proposed scheme has obvious advantages than the other
four schemes in both the aspects. Therefore, our scheme can
accommodate more transmission tasks while realizing higher
level of security in VANETs, and it is more suitable for
VANETs.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposed a novel and practical ID-based CPPA
scheme based on invocating the registration list to reflect
the role of the revocation list. The proposed scheme greatly
reduces the time taken to retrieve the registration list and
effectively improves the security of VANETs. Moreover, our
scheme does not use bilinear pairing, which is the most
complicated operation in modern cryptography, and effectively
reduces the length of messages sent by vehicles. Therefore, the
proposed scheme also effectively improves the communication
performance and efficiency of VANETs.
Security analyses showed that the proposed scheme is not
only effective in satisfying the basic security requirements of
VANETs but also efficient in preventing the malicious vehicle
or the compromised RSU from disrupting VANET security
protocols because of the presence of the registration list.
Performance analyses demonstrated that our proposed scheme
achieves better performance in reducing both the computation
overhead and the communication overhead compared to exist-
ing schemes, and further exhibits better practical application
in current VANETs. As future work, we plan to study means
of reducing the operation time of the TA and RSU and the
delay time between them, which can obviously increase the
security and efficiency of VANETs.
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